Qubole AWS Integration Breach Exposed Customer Cloud Data and Credentials

| 2 Min Read
An attacker used Qubole’s AWS access to reach dozens of customer environments, download data and collect credentials across AWS, Entra ID and Okta.
I’ll preserve the supplied facts and HTML structure, expand the analysis around the attack path and response implications, and keep the output as valid HTML only.

How a dormant integration became an access path

The Qubole supply-chain attack shows how a cloud integration can remain a route into customer environments long after teams stop using the service. From October 14 to 26, an attacker used credentials tied to Qubole’s AWS account to assume customer roles, inspect cloud resources, and take data and credentials. The central weakness wasn’t a newly installed tool at each victim: it was trust that customers had already configured and left in place.

Sentra detected suspicious activity across multiple environments and estimated that dozens of Qubole customers were affected. Wiz investigated with Sentra and Mandiant, but the campaign hasn’t been attributed to a known threat group. That uncertainty limits what can be said about the operator’s identity or broader aims; the activity itself offers a clearer account of how the access worked.

Trusted roles opened the door

Qubole integrations use cross-account AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles. Customers configure those roles to trust identities from Qubole’s AWS account, with an External ID as an additional check. The attacker had credentials that met that requirement, and every malicious role assumption Wiz identified succeeded. The External ID therefore didn’t stop the access once the attacker had the credentials needed to satisfy the configured trust.

Wiz first observed suspicious requests on October 14. They came from an IP address associated with Mullvad VPN and targeted customer integration roles from Qubole AWS account 805246085872. The requests used IAM user AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS. For defenders, the account and identity details provide concrete starting points for reviewing logs, though a single indicator won’t establish whether an environment was affected.

Most later activity came from an OVH-hosted virtual private server at 57.129.54[.]120. On October 18, the attacker began using a second IAM identity associated with Qubole’s account, alongside another Mullvad VPN address. Many targeted roles had seen no legitimate Qubole activity that month, yet their trust permissions remained enabled. That gap matters: a role can look quiet in routine operations while still accepting access from a vendor identity.

Once inside, the attacker mapped S3 buckets, databases, EC2 instances, security groups, and IAM identities. The intruder also queried AWS Secrets Manager, Systems Manager Parameter Store, and Lambda configurations for credentials and other sensitive information. This sequence resembles a common cloud intrusion pattern: first learn what’s reachable, then search for data and credentials that could extend access.

Data downloads yielded credentials across cloud services

The attacker enumerated accessible S3 buckets and objects, then downloaded their contents. In some sessions, Wiz found that entire buckets were retrieved. That level of collection means a review limited to changes in cloud resources could miss the core activity; read access and data transfer deserve close attention too.

Credentials found in compromised environments were tested with TruffleHog, a secrets-scanning tool. The material included AWS access keys, Microsoft Entra ID service principal credentials, and Okta OAuth client credentials. Sentra said it identified more than 100 passwords and keys read within minutes, plus thousands of credential records in downloaded files. Those findings point to exposure across services, not just the AWS accounts used to reach the data.

Sentra observed no write operations in the affected environments, pointing to a campaign centered on collection and theft. That focus makes the credentials gathered in the operation a significant concern: they could expose services beyond the AWS accounts initially accessed. This is more significant than it looks. A read only intrusion can still create follow-on risk when files contain secrets that grant access elsewhere.

A Linux image was found on attacker infrastructure

Wiz found a bootable Linux ISO named “sso_agent.iso” on the attacker’s OVH server. The image gathers system information, connects to the server over TCP port 23458, and can run shell commands sent remotely. Its configuration suggests it may have been intended to target Windows systems, though that clue doesn’t establish how or whether the image was used.

Wiz found no evidence that the image had been deployed and couldn’t confirm whether it was used against victims. Its presence adds another element to the investigation, but the observed customer activity centered on cloud access and data collection. For now, the ISO is an investigative lead, not evidence of a separate confirmed infection.

Review old integrations and role activity

Wiz recommends reviewing AWS CloudTrail records from October 1, 2026, across accounts with Qubole integration roles. Investigators should check for unusual AssumeRole requests from Qubole’s AWS account, especially activity from non-AWS infrastructure and the IAM identities identified in the disclosure. They should also examine related access to Secrets Manager, Parameter Store, Lambda, and S3. If you’re working in this space, the review needs to follow the chain from role assumption through resource access and downloads.

The incident highlights the value of treating third-party trust as an active access path. Remove integrations that are no longer used, limit role trust to specific vendor IAM principals, and constrain role assumption to documented vendor network ranges with AWS source IP or VPC endpoint conditions. These controls narrow which identities and network paths can use a role; they don’t remove the need to review activity when a vendor account is compromised.

Why dormant trust deserves attention

A role that sits unused can still matter if its trust remains in place. That’s the part many teams can overlook: decommissioning a service in day to day operations doesn’t necessarily revoke the cloud permissions created for it. Inventory and cleanup of third party roles are therefore part of ordinary access management, especially when those roles can read storage or retrieve secrets.

The disclosed activity also shows why cloud investigations need to account for data access, not only attempted changes or service disruption. The attacker’s ability to enumerate resources and retrieve files created a path to credentials from several services, while Sentra reported no write operations. And yet. Without confirmed evidence about how the Linux image was used or whether exposed credentials led to further access, the scope of possible consequences remains uncertain.

For customers, the practical question is whether any Qubole trust relationship remains active and whether its use matches documented business needs. Reviewing the named identities, network indicators, and cloud service activity can help establish what happened in an account. The broader lesson is straightforward: third party access should remain visible, bounded, and removable when the integration is no longer needed. A quiet role can still be an open door.

Source: Joseph Jones · www.csoonline.com

Comments

Please sign in to comment.